wa-law.org > bill > 2025-26 > HB 2597 > Original Bill
The legislature finds and declares that:
Since the earliest days of the nation, the United States supreme court has held, in cases such as Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804), and Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 6 U.S. 64 (1804), that federal officials may be liable in damages for violations of federal laws.
The United States supreme court has long held that federal employees are not inherently beyond the reach of state laws simply because they are federal employees. For example, in Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920), the court noted, "[A]n employee of the United States does not secure a general immunity from state law while acting in the course of his employment," and in Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. 510 (1932), the court stated, "Federal officers and employees are not, merely because they are such, granted immunity from prosecution in state courts for crimes against state law."
Decades later, the United States supreme court continued to recognize the role of state law in holding federal officials accountable for legal violations, noting in Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963), "[w]hen it comes to suits for damages for abuse of power, federal officials are usually governed by local law."
When the United States supreme court recognized a federal law cause of action for violation of certain constitutional rights in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), that cause of action was in addition to, rather than instead of, traditional state law remedies. Even one of the dissenting justices in Bivens noted the ongoing role of state law, writing, "The task of evaluating the pros and cons of creating judicial remedies for particular wrongs is a matter for Congress and the legislatures of the States."
More recently, congress has made federal statutory law the exclusive remedy for certain claims sounding in tort, but this exclusivity specifically "does not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of the Government... which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States..." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2679. The prime sponsor of legislation amending the federal tort claims act to provide for limited exclusivity took pains to clarify, "We make special provisions here to make clear that the more controversial issue of constitutional torts is not covered by this bill. If you are accused of having violated someone's constitutional rights, this bill does not affect it." 134 Cong. Rec. 15963 (1988).
In 2022, in declining to extend the scope of the Bivens action in Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022), the United States supreme court observed that legislatures, not courts, are the better branches of government to fashion damages remedies.
In its most recently completed term, the United States supreme court declined, in Martin v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 1689 (2025), to extend the doctrine of supremacy clause immunity beyond its traditional criminal law context.
Violating the federal constitutional rights of residents of the United States has never been and can never be "necessary and proper" to the execution of the laws and powers of the United States within the meaning of Article I, section 8, clause 18 of the United States Constitution.
In enacting this act, Washington affirms its longstanding and rightful role as a sovereign state in providing a forum in its courts for adjudication of claims of federal constitutional violations.
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A person who is injured during civil immigration enforcement by any government agent who, whether or not under color of law, violates the United States Constitution while participating in civil immigration enforcement, may bring a civil action against the government agent in any court.
A person found to have violated the United States Constitution while participating in civil immigration enforcement is liable to the injured person for legal relief, equitable relief, and any other appropriate relief. A prevailing plaintiff may recover compensatory and punitive damages.
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In an action brought pursuant to this section, a court shall award reasonable attorney fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff. In actions for injunctive relief, a court shall deem a plaintiff to have prevailed if the plaintiff's suit was a substantial factor or significant catalyst in obtaining the results sought by the litigation.
When a judgment is entered in favor of a defendant, the court may award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the defendant for defending any claims the court finds frivolous.
To the maximum extent permissible under the United States and Washington Constitutions, a grant of any immunity to a defendant including, but not limited to, sovereign immunity, official immunity, intergovernmental immunity, qualified immunity, supremacy clause immunity, statutory immunity, or common law immunity, does not apply in any action brought pursuant to this section.
The definitions in this subsection apply throughout this section unless the context clearly requires otherwise.
"Civil immigration enforcement" means any action to investigate, question, detain, transfer, arrest, or remove any person for the purpose of enforcing civil immigration law.
"Government agent" means any officer, employee, contractor, or other agent of any local or state government, or of the United States federal government, whose duties include: (i) The enforcement of local, state, or federal laws; (ii) the maintenance of public safety or order; or (iii) local, state, or national defense.
A civil action described in this section must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.
If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected.
If any part of this act is found to be in conflict with federal requirements that are a prescribed condition to the allocation of federal funds to the state, the conflicting part of this act is inoperative solely to the extent of the conflict and with respect to the agencies directly affected, and this finding does not affect the operation of the remainder of this act in its application to the agencies concerned. Rules adopted under this act must meet federal requirements that are a necessary condition to the receipt of federal funds by the state.
This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and takes effect immediately.